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Defense of the Kansas Frontier 1864-1865

by Marvin H. Garfield

February 1932 (Vol. 1, No. 2), pages 140 to 152
Transcribed by lhn; HTML editing by Tod Roberts
digitized with permission of the Kansas Historical Society.

BEFORE the outbreak of the Civil War, the plains Indians and the rapidly onrushing white invaders had come to look upon each other as enemies. To the plains Indians it mattered little during the Civil War whether a white man espoused the cause of the Union or the Confederacy. They recognized all white men as common enemies. The Comanche Indians will serve as an illustration. In Texas the members of this tribe raided the settlements of Confederates, while farther to the north in Kansas other Comanches were engaged in depredations upon the lives of Union men and women. These Indians were too little concerned with the issues in the slavery struggle and too far away from the scene of action to have been an important factor in the war. Nevertheless, North and South accused each other of having incited Indian attacks. Especially was this accusation circulated in Kansas. Throughout the Civil War Kansas newspapers alleged that Confederate plotters were at work among the plains tribes, and particularly among the Cheyennes and Arapahoes. Governor Crawford shared this view also. [1]

In contrast. with the number of rumors of collusion between the Confederates and Indians, however, the proven instances were few. In 1864 Gen. S. R. Curtis, commander of the Military Department of Kansas, fearing that the Confederates were planning to make a raid upon Fort Larned and Fort Lyon, ordered federal troops to be transferred from the Platte to the Arkansas river. The Confederate raid proved to be only a rumor. [2] Some evidence, nevertheless, does exist to show that the Indians were aware of Confederate plans. Simon Whitely, United States Indian agent at Denver, mentioned having heard threats by Comanches, Kiowas and Cheyennes to take all the forts on the Arkansas river when joined by the Texas soldiers. [3] Despite these disquieting rumors, the War Department reports from the plains indicate that prior to March, 1864, no conclusive information had reached headquarters that. the Indians were planning hostilities. [4]


General Curtis was busily engaged at that time in fighting bushwhackers on the border and evidently had no idea that an Indian war was at hand. Like the Sioux War in Minnesota during 1862, the Cheyenne War of 1864 was precipitated by injudicious action upon the part of young military officers. A certain Lieutenant Eayre, in attempting to recover cattle supposedly stolen by Cheyennes, punished the wrong Indians. To make matters worse, Lieutenant Dunn, of the First Colorado cavalry, on April 12 attacked a small band of Dog Soldier Cheyennes on the South Platte. The Indians were young warriors who were on their way north to visit their Northern Cheyenne relatives. A little later Lieutenant Eayre drove Crow Chief and his Cheyenne band from their camp on the Republican river. In another expedition Eayre and his troops met a group of Cheyennes near Fort Larned and attacked them. This time he received the worst of the encounter and was forced to retreat to the fort. The wrath of the warlike Cheyennes was aroused to a high degree by these attacks. A general Indian outbreak in eastern Colorado and western Kansas and Nebraska was the result.

Logically the Indians selected the great western highways as their main objectives. Immediately following Lieutenant Eayre's fight with the Indians near Larned the redskins raided the stage road between Fort Larned and Fort Riley. Arapahoes, antagonized by Captain Parmenter, of Fort Larned, joined their Cheyenne friends on the warpath. The combined tribes then set about systematically to attack the Platte trail and Santa Fe trail, concentrating their efforts on the former. The trail to Santa Fe was generally left to the tender mercies of the Kiowas and Comanches residing south of the Arkansas river, who also took to the warpath.

Realizing that a general outbreak was at hand, Gen. Robert B. Mitchell, commanding the Nebraska district of the Military Department of Kansas, asked General Curtis on May 27 for one thousand men and an artillery battery to protect the Platte trail. Governor Evans, of Colorado territory, also requested that Curtis protect the South Platte and Arkansas routes. The Colorado executive, apparently not getting satisfaction from the department commander, on June 16 turned to General Carleton at Santa Fe for aid. He desired that Carleton send troops to Fort Union, New Mexico, subject to call from Colorado. [5] An attempt at handling the hostile Indians was made by Governor Evans in June. A proclamation was issued and sent to the Indian tribes in eastern Colo-


rado warning all friendly bands to report at specified concentration points. Cheyennes and Arapahoes were assigned to Fort Lyon while the Kiowas and Comanches were ordered to Fort Larned. But this proclamation was generally ignored by the Indians. [6]

Since the aborigines preferred taking chances with their lives in preference to coming in and being "good Indians," the war on the plains continued throughout the summer. In July the hostiles again commenced depredations in the neighborhood of Fort Larned. A government train bound for Fort Union, New Mexico, was attacked and twelve men were killed, while a large quantity of merchandise was destroyed. [7] Shortly afterwards four large trains were besieged near Cow Creek, where a battle ensued. The beleaguered crews were finally rescued by some of Curtis' forces from Fort Riley. [8]

General Curtis had taken the field during July in a campaign designed both to protect the trails and settlements and intimidate the Indians. Kansas militia, stationed at Emporia, were ordered to report to Curtis and hold themselves in readiness for assistance. [9] Curtis reported that his force numbered 396 men and consisted of militia, volunteers and regulars aided by a section of Ninth Wisconsin artillery. In his letters the general referred to the siege on Cow Creek and an attack by Indians on Fort Larned. [10] Curtis was highly commended by the press for his energetic campaign. [11] Before he had time really to accomplish much in an Indian war, however, it became necessary for him to abandon the project and return to Fort Leavenworth. The eastern border of Kansas demanded immediate protection against the threatening raid of Gen. Sterling Price into western Missouri. Curtis' chief accomplishment during his summer on the plains was the founding of two military posts, Fort Ellsworth (Harker) and Fort Zarah.

While Curtis was still on the plains numerous Indian attacks occurred in northern Kansas and southern Nebraska. Newspaper reports from Marysville, Kan., stated that sixteen whites had been killed and scalped and that nearly the entire population of Washington county was encamped in the town for protection. [12] In


Marshall county the militia, assisted by a company of Seventh Iowa cavalry, staged a four-hour battle with a superior Indian force, but were compelled to retreat. [13] In Nebraska and eastern Colorado the overland mail was forced to abandon 400 miles of its route, while all stations but one along a line of 120 miles had been burned. Immigration into Colorado and California over the Platte trail was seriously checked. [14] The hostile Indians were reported to have proclaimed that the land belonged exclusively to them and that they intended to regain and hold it if they were forced to destroy every white man, woman and child to accomplish their purpose. [15] To meet this situation Governor Evans in August issued a proclamation to Colorado citizens advising them to hunt down Indians and kill all hostiles. This resulted in all the Indians of the region going to war. [16] Evans later testified before a joint congressional committee that he had issued this proclamation at a time when Colorado had no troops to defend it. [17]

In an effort to make peace, Major Wyncoop, commander at Fort Lyon, rounded up the leading Cheyenne and Arapahoe chiefs and took them to Denver to interview the governor. Evans refused to come to terms with the chiefs, informing them that he was not the peacemaking power and that they must make peace with the military authorities. [18] For taking this stand Governor Evans was severely rebuked by Commissioner Dole of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Mr. Dole reminded Evans that his duty as ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs in Colorado required him to receive and encourage all overtures of peace made by the Indians. [19]

Peace efforts having failed, the Indian war continued until cold weather drove the hostiles into winter quarters. Before the descent of winter, however, there were several Indian scares in Kansas. Manhattan residents on October 19 informed Adjutant General Holliday that the entire military escort of the Santa Fe express had been massacred west of Salina. Holliday was petitioned, consequently, to send the Pottawatomie county militia back to the western frontier at once. [20] The adjutant general as a result directed


Col. John T. Price, of the Fifteenth Kansas militia, then located at Fort Riley, to give special attention to the frontier in the neighborhood of Salina. Governor Carney was also requested by Holliday to grant the petition concerning the Pottawatomie county militia. Colonel Price, however, discovered that the story of the massacre of the stage escort was a fake. The escort arrived safely at Fort Zarah although the frightened stage driver, having mistaken buffalo for Indians, returned to Salina. Price promised to keep the state authorities informed concerning future Indian disturbances. He clearly indicated, on the other hand, that he would use his discretion in defending the frontier settlements. [21]

As a climax to the year's fighting came the Chivington massacre of the Cheyenne Indians at Sand creek on November 29. The Sand creek camp was located near Fort Lyon on the reservation which had been set aside for the Cheyenne and Arapahoe tribes by the treaty of Fort Wise [later Fort Lyon] in 1861. As a matter of fact the Cheyennes had seldom remained on the reservation, which lay south of the Arkansas river in Colorado, but had roamed at will from the Red river to the North Platte. In the late summer of 1864, however, Black Kettle and White Antelope, in compliance with Governor Evans' proclamation, brought in a part of their respective bands of Cheyennes and camped near Fort Lyon. The camp was composed almost entirely of women, children, and old men. The warriors in most cases remained on the warpath. [22] While Black Kettle, White Antelope and other chiefs were in Denver engaging in a peace pow-wow with Governor Evans three war parties of Cheyennes and two of Arapahoes were still out. [23]

On November 29 the Cheyenne and Arapahoe camp on Sand creek was attacked by Colonel Chivington with a large force composed of regulars and Colorado volunteers. Of the 500 Indians in camp about 150 were killed, two-thirds being women and children. [24] The slaughter was frightful, since the Indians were surprised and poorly armed. Atrocities committed by the troops were fully as bad as those usually practiced by Indians upon their victims.25 Fol-


lowing the attack, the remnants of the tribes fled to the Big Timbers of the Smoky Hill river in western Kansas.

A great furor was raised in the East when the news of the massacre was fully published. General Halleck, chief of staff, at once ordered an investigation of Chivington's conduct, while General Curtis attempted to have him court-martialed. Chivington's term of service had expired, though, and he was beyond the reach of military law. Congress in 1865 attempted to punish Chivington and all members of the Third Colorado regiment who engaged in the massacre. The resolution, S. R. 93, was introduced into the senate to suspend the pay of all officers and men who had participated until an investigation could take place. The measure passed the senate in January, but was defeated in the house. [26] In the following session of congress, however, the annual Indian appropriation bill was so amended that the members of the Cheyenne and Arapahoe bands who suffered at Sand creek were to be recompensed in United States securities, animals, goods, provisions or such articles as the Secretary of the Interior might direct. The total amount of these gifts was $39,050. [27] This congressional act was in harmony with article six of the treaty of the Little Arkansas, which had been drawn up on October 14, 1865. The entire article was a. condemnation by the United States government of Chivington's action. [28]

Explanations of the Sand creek massacre stressed three factors. First, that it was good judgment to carry the war to the home of the Indian, and that experience had proved that by such methods alone could Indian uprisings be crushed. Chivington used the same procedure which later won such nationwide fame for Sheridan and Custer. Secondly, there had been a demand for a winter campaign against the Indians. This had been urged on November 19, by General Hunt, commander of the upper Arkansas district, in a letter to General Curtis. [29] Also, Governor Evans, of Colorado, had previously suggested the scheme as the only means of conquering the hostiles and bringing them to respect governmental authority. [30] Public opinion in the frontier regions also was favorable to the plan. The Junction City Union, a Kansas paper, openly advocated it on August 20, 1864:


"A successful war can only be waged against them [the Indians] by organizing an expedition that will penetrate their country and find the rendezvous of their women and children. Then they will stand and fight armed men and not before."

A third reason for the massacre is that the "hundred-day volunteers" who made up the Third Colorado cavalry were chiefly frontiersmen who had suffered at the hands of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes throughout the previous summer. To these men rules of warfare meant nothing. They retaliated with atrocity for atrocity. [31]

In the long run the real sufferer from the Chivington massacre was the frontier settler. Public sentiment in the East largely turned against him and sympathized with the Indian. This view spread into congress and seriously handicapped legislation aimed at frontier defense. Senator Ross, of Kansas, on July 18, 1867, attempted to amend an army bill by providing that the general of the army should be authorized to accept the services of mounted volunteers from the governors of western states for suppression of Indian hostilities. He was outvoted, however, and compelled to accept a modification which defeated the purpose of the amendment. [32] Morrill, of Maine, speaking in opposition to Ross, stated that volunteers from the frontier states caused all the difficulties with the Indians. As an example he cited the work of the Colorado volunteers in the Chivington Massacre. [33]

Indian raids did not die out altogether during the winter of 18641865. Early in the new year a raid occurred on the Santa Fe trail west of Fort Larned. Cheyennes and Arapahoes numbering close to 150 attacked a wagon train at Nine Mile ridge, wounding six white men. The Indian loss was unknown. [34] Shortly after this episode the hostile bands of the two tribes moved north into Nebraska headed for the Powder river country. General Mitchell, commanding the district of Nebraska (this was before its reorganization in 1865 as the Department of the Platte), in order to drive the Indians out of the Republican valley region, burned the prairie grass for over 100 miles. [35] The burned area extended throughout a favorite Indian hunting region. This action of Mitchell's contributed to the exodus of the hostiles from Kansas and southern Nebraska. It simply meant, on the other hand, that their forces


were to be concentrated with the hostile Sioux along the Platte trail and Overland telegraph line. As a consequence the great Indian wars of 1865 took place outside of Kansas.

During the absence of the Cheyennes and Arapahoes the Kansas frontier enjoyed a brief respite. Of course, the Kiowas and Comanches were engaged in a series of depredations, but, comparatively, things were quiet during the spring and summer. On April 25 Indians attacked Cow Creek station on the Santa Fe Stage Company line driving off sixteen head of cattle. [36] On June 9 Kiowas charged upon a wagon train on Crooked creek in the southwestern section of the state. The train, which consisted of about seventy wagons under a military escort, successfully defended itself. In August the government was compelled to send a heavy escort to Fort Zarah in order to prevent the Indians from confiscating the 8,000 rations which were being delivered to the fort. [37] These rations were consigned to the Indians, but the Great Father at Washington preferred handing them out to his red children instead of having them taken by force.

Having learned by experience the terrible cost of the Indian war of the preceding year, the United States military authorities took steps in 1865 contemplated to bring the war to a close. A threefold plan was developed: First, to defend the settlements and routes of travel from Indian aggression; second, to invade the Powder river region in the Dakotas and strike a blow which would teach the Indian to respect the power of the government; third, to make peace with the Indians in Kansas and arrange for their removal from the state. In pursuance of the first objective the Kansas government and people cooperated. Kansas troops also made up a large part of General Dodge's Powder river expedition. As to the wisdom of the third part of the plan, making peace with the Indians, Kansans were frankly dubious.

The Kansas state legislature on January 17, 1865, adopted a concurrent resolution requesting congress to secure from the President (1) full and ample protection against hostile Indians on the western border; (2) prosecution of an active campaign against the Indians by an adequate force of federal troops; (3) permission for the governor of Kansas to organize a regiment of veteran volunteer cavalry to serve for one year in the Indian campaign.38 These


requests reveal the trend of popular feeling within the state at the time.

Another event of significance in January was the reorganization of the military departments. The old Department of Kansas was replaced by the Department of the Missouri with Gen. Grenville M. Dodge succeeding General Curtis. The state legislature upon receipt of this information extended Curtis a vote of thanks for his services. [39]

In an effort to insure a greater degree of safety to travel on the Santa Fe trail, Colonel Ford, commanding the district of the upper Arkansas, provided for escort service between Council Grove and Fort Larned. [40] Twice a month, on the first and the fifteenth, a company of troops left Council Grove as an escort for travelers and freighters. From Larned west to Fort Union, New Mexico, the escort was composed of troops sent from the district. of New Mexico. [41] A similar arrangement was made for east-bound transportation. Fort Dodge was also constructed during the year as an added protection to Santa Fe travel.

An additional burden of protection was put upon the shoulders of the military authorities in Kansas when the Butterfield Overland Despatch line was organized in 1865. Its route extended 585 miles from Leavenworth and Atchison to Denver via the Smoky Hill river. [42] In order to give the route adequate defense, a chain of forts and outposts was constructed along the Smoky Hill valley by the government. The Butterfield line, despite this assistance, failed to make profits. Hostile Indians and the competition of the Holladay line on the Platte trail proved its undoing. [43]

The frontier settlements in Western Kansas were successfully defended during the year by Colonel Cloud and the Fifteenth Kansas cavalry. 44 A contemplated offensive against the Indians by Colonel Ford was never carried out due to the interference of Colonel Leavenworth, agent to the Kiowas and Comanches, who fancied that he could end the war by negotiation. [45] Colonel Ford was delayed by Interior Department officials until spring was so


far advanced that the hostiles were too strong to be attacked by his forces.

While these events were transpiring, Governor Crawford was not idle. With his customary energy he plunged into the problem of frontier defense early in the year. In answer to numerous petitions from settlers in the south-central portion of the state, he endeavored to persuade both Curtis and Dodge to send a small force of cavalry to the region. [46] Troubles had arisen between settlers and Indians in the Indian Territory on account of cattle stealing. Many settlers were leaving because of the danger of possible Indian raids.

In August the governor wrote to General Sheridan asking for the immediate muster-out of the Eighth and Tenth Kansas volunteer infantry. The reason given for the request was that the Indian situation on the western border looked threatening. [47] A few days later a similar request for the muster-out of the Sixteenth Kansas cavalry was transmitted to General Grant. [48]

While the Fifteenth Kansas cavalry remained in the state, the Eleventh and the Sixteenth were sent north with General Dodge to restore communication along the Platte trail, to protect frontier settlements, and to drive the Indians into the Black Hills. [49] Although in February it had been the purpose of the Department of the Missouri to send the entire Eleventh cavalry into the Smoky Hill region for an Indian campaign, a change of orders sent them to Fort Kearney, Nebraska. While part of the regiment guarded the Platte trail and Overland telegraph, the remainder was sent to Fort Laramie for the spring campaign against the Sioux on Powder river. [50] The work of protecting the transcontinental highway was difficult. Indians fairly swarmed along the telegraph line, but the soldiers were never driven from the field and the wires were kept in working order." On June 11 Col. Preston B. Plumb was ordered to reopen and protect the Overland stage line and give all possible protection to emigrants and other travel. For the next


two months Plumb and his men guarded the stage line, drove the stages by using cavalry horses, and kept the United States mail on schedule. [52] In August the Eleventh cavalry was ordered to Fort Leavenworth and mustered out of service.

Less glorious was the performance of the Sixteenth Kansas cavalry in the Black Hills. The Sixteenth had the misfortune to participate in a disastrous campaign. General Connor's forces were outnumbered and out-generaled by the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors. The attempt to strike the Indian in his stronghold resulted in so much grief that the project had to be abandoned. The losses of the Sixteenth nevertheless were very small. One soldier was killed and one wounded . [53]

In October General Grant announced his Indian policy. Generals Sherman and Pope were instructed to give particular attention to the problem of putting an end to Indian troubles along the great overland highways. Additional permanent forts were to be established along the Platte, Smoky Hill and Arkansas river routes. Finally the volunteers were to be replaced by 4,000 colored troops. [54] The Negroes were supposedly more free from prejudices against the Indians. [55] In addition to this advantage the Negroes were willing to serve, whereas the white volunteers became quite ineffective on account of their anxiety to be mustered out. [56]

Another important event of October, 1865, was the negotiation of a treaty with the southern plains tribes. The Chivington massacre had the effect of practically annulling the treaty of Fort Wise, since the Cheyennes and Arapahoes were afraid to remain in the region set aside for them in Colorado by the treaty. Hence it was desirable to make a new treaty which would include not only peace terms but provisions for settling the Indians on a permanent reservation. Indian commissioners selected by congress came to Kansas in October and negotiated treaties with the Cheyenne, Arapahoe, Comanche, and Kiowa tribes. Two treaties were made: one with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, the other with the Comanches and Kiowas. On October 14, on the Little Arkansas river, near the site of the present city of Wichita, the final agreements were drawn up. The United States was represented


by seven commissioners: General Sanborn; Gen. W. S. Harney; Thomas Murphy, superintendent of Indians affairs in the central superintendency; Kit Carson, the famous frontiersman; William W. Bent, the fur trader; Jesse H. Leavenworth, agent of the Comanches and Kiowas; and James Steele. The Indian delegation was composed of the most influential members of their respective tribes. [57] The most important terms of the treaty were contained in articles 2, 3 and 4. The first. of these provided for setting aside a permanent reservation for the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, south of the Arkansas river in Kansas and Indian Territory. The Kiowas and Comanches were assigned to a region in northwestern Texas and Indian Territory. The Indians were not to settle upon the reservations until the United States had extinguished the titles of the Cherokees and other claimants. When absent from these reservations the Indians were not to go within ten miles of any of the main-traveled routes. All claims of the Indians to the region between the Platte and the Arkansas were given up. Article 3 permitted the Indians to range in the unsettled portions between the two rivers. Article 9 abrogated all existing treaties. [58]

The United States senate on May 22, 1866, ratified the treaty with four amendments. The most significant of these was the amendment to article 2. The senate provided that no Indian reservation mentioned in the treaty should be located within the state of Kansas. It was also amended to remove personal reference to Colonel Chivington. [59]

The senate amendments were accepted by the Indians in November, 1866, and the treaty was formally proclaimed by President Johnson on February 2, 1867.60

As a preventive of future Indian wars the treaty was defective. The Cheyennes and Arapahoes were left without any definite reservation, since the senate amendment to article 2 excluded them from Kansas, while article 9 took away their Colorado reserve. With these tribes turned loose and allowed to roam at will between the Platte and the Arkansas, the danger of conflict with the whites remained as grave a problem as ever. Furthermore, that part of article 2 which provided for the Indians remaining away from the


main-traveled routes could not possibly have been enforced except by the Indians themselves.

Much evidence exists to cast doubt upon the permanency of the Indians' peaceful intentions. On their way to the council grounds a party of braves celebrated by attacking a Mexican train near Fort Dodge and killing five men. [61] Also, the treaty, like most agreements with the Indians, was made in the fall when the warriors were tired of fighting and were looking forward to a winter of rest and recuperation in order to get ready for another big year. In November, 1865, consequently, Colonel Leavenworth was able to report truthfully that "his Indians" had for the most part, if not entirely, stopped depredations along the Santa Fe trail. [62]


1. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 223.
2. G. B. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 144.
3. Report of the Commission of Indian Affairs 1864, 236-237.
4. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, 131.
5. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, 229.
6. Ibid. 23, 218-219.
7. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), July 27, 1864.
8. Ibid. August 7, 1864. (Reprint from the Leavenworth Conservative.)
9. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864, (Kansas). Major Pollard, commander of the Eighth regiment K. S. M. had previously urged Governor Carney to let the regiment assist Curtis. Pollard to Carney, July 24.
10. Kansas Daily Tribune, (Lawrence) August 7, 1864. A reprint from the Leavenworth Conservative.
11. Kansas Daily Tribune, August 10.
12. Ibid., August 23. Reprint from Marysville (Kansas) Enterprise.
13. Ibid., August 24. Reprint from Leavenworth Conservative.
14. Letter from general superintendent of the Overland mail line to the Hon. Wm. P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, August 31, 1864, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1864,, 254,
15. Ibid., 255.
16. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, 148.
17. Senate Report No. 156, Appendix, 39 Cong., 2d sess., 48.
18. Ibid., 47.
19. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 1864, 256.
20. Adjutant General's Correspondence 1864. (Kansas.)
21. Price to Holliday, October 31, 1864, Adjutant General's Correspondence, 1864.
22. Even George Bird Grinnell, who presents the Cheyenne side of the story, admits that most of the Indians in the tribe were hostile. He states that the old men were for peace while the young men were all for war, The Fighting Cheyennes, 152; for Governor Evans' side of the case see Senate Report 156, Appendix, 43-49, 39 Cong., 2d sess. 23. Black Kettle and other chiefs to Major Colley, August 29, 1864, Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, 152.
24. Kansas Historical Collections, VII, 67, footnote. Chivington in his report stated that over 600 were killed, while George Bent estimated 150.
25. Numerous testimonials given before the Joint Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War agree on this statement.
26. Senate and House Proceedings 1865, Cong. Globe, 38 Cong., 2d sess., 254, 1336.
27. Senate Debate 1866, Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess., 3506.
28. Official Copy of the original treaty. Archives, Kansas Historical Society.
29. Grinnell, The Fighting Cheyennes, 161.
30. Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1864, 222.
36. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), May 2, 1865.
37. Junction City (Kansas) Union, August 19, 1865.
38. House Journal, Kansas Legislature 1865, 88-89.
31. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, 353-356.
32. Senate Debate 1867, Cong. Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess. (Debate on the Ross Amendment to S. 136.), 708-709.
33. Ibid., 708.
34. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) January 15, 1865.
35. Ibid., February 2, 1865. Report of General Mitchell to General Curtis January 29.
39. House Journal, Kansas Legislature, 1865, 168.
40. Colonel Ford's order was published in the Kansas Daily Tribune
(Lawrence) May 11, 1865.
41. Ibid.
42. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, 395.
43. Root and Connelley, The Overland Stage, 400-401.
44. Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 224.
45. Editorial, Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence) May 2, 1865.
46. Crawford to Curtis, February 7, 1865, Correspondence of Kansas Governors, Crawford, (Letterpress books), 1863-1866, 28. Hereafter cited C. K. G. Crawford (Letterpress books); Letter from Crawford to General Dodge, February 11, 1865, Correspondence of Kansas Governor Crawford, (Copy Book), 4-5. Hereafter cited as C. K. G. Crawford (Copy Book). Archives Kansas Historical Society.
47. Crawford to Sheridan, August 12, 1865, C. K. G. Crawford, (Copy Book), 13.
48. Crawford to Grant August 29, 1865, C. K. G. Crawford, (Letterpress Book), 53.
49. Will C. Ferril, "The Sixteenth Kansas Cavalry in the Black Hills in
1865," The Kansas Historical Collections, XVII, 855. 50. Official Military History of Kansas Regiments, 338-339, Library of the Kansas Historical Society, n. d., n. p.
51. Ibid., 342.
52. Official Military History of Kansas Regiments, 342. 453. Wilder, D. W.: Annals of Kansas, 381.
54. Junction City (Kansas) Union, October 28, 1865; Daily Kansas Tribune (Lawrence) October 26, 1865.
55. Junction City Union, October 28, 1865.
56. Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), September 14, 1865.
57. Official Copy of the Original Treaty, Archives, Kansas Historical Society.
58. Ibid.
59. Cf. Previous reference to article of the treaty.
60. Official Copy of Original Treaty. Archives, Kansas Historical Society.
61. Editorial in Kansas Daily Tribune (Lawrence), October 5, 1865.
62. Report of the Central Superintendency, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 1865, 46.